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Spain’s experience is one of the longest. One of the first basin agencies established in
Spain was for the Guadalquivir River in the south. A case study of that river basin and its
management indicates how basin management is shaped by political economy factors such
as the historical path of the agency’s evolution, the basin agency’s relationships with
central government and with regional or local governments, the patterns of water user
representation within the agency, and developments in water law and policy external to the
basin agency. The case raises questions about whether and how integrated water resources
management at the river basin scale is implemented, even in locations where basin
agencies already exist. It also suggests that the politics of management at the river basin
level will affect the implementation of national water policies intended to promote
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1. Introduction
[2] Integrated water resource management (IWRM) and
organizing it primarily at the river basin level are two of the
most common and widely repeated recommendations in the
water resources literature of the last decade, if not longer.
Basin management is also often associated with the concept
of decentralization, of managing water resources at the
‘‘lowest appropriate level’’ [see e.g., United Nations,
1992; World Bank, 1993; Lee and Dinar, 1996; Solanes,
1998]. Several conceptual arguments have been presented in
favor of decentralization in water resource management and
basin-level management in particular: that the whole array
of resources and use patterns in the basin will be taken into
account, public participation will be greater and broader,
management decisions will be based on better knowledge of
local conditions, and so on.
[3] Empirical studies of river basin management systems
provide opportunities to examine the claims made for basin-
level integrated resources management and to explore
factors that appear to influence its implementation and
outcomes. Because river basin management agencies have
existed in Spain since the 1920s and because Spanish water
policy has turned toward integrated water resource manage-
ment since the 1980s, Spain provides a welcome setting for
such an examination. As part of a team pursuing a larger
project, we recently participated in a case study of the
Guadalquivir River Basin in Spain.
[4] We pursued a case study approach for this project in
order to employ a close examination of historical processes
and institutional change. Research team members collected
documents concerning the origins, processes, and results of
decentralization reforms to prepare for interviews with
stakeholders during a site visit. The site visit was facilitated
by a local university faculty member and expert on the river
basin, who arranged interviews and also prepared a back-
ground paper on the basin prior to the visit. During the site
visit, team members met with basin-level stakeholders,
central government officials and basin management agency
staff, and a regional government official responsible for
water policy and management. The basin stakeholders
included representatives of three irrigation communities in
the basin, a basin-wide association of irrigation communi-
ties, and two different types of urban water supply and
sanitation service providers. Although it is impossible to
verify the representativeness of the interviewees (in terms of
how they compare with all irrigators or all urban suppliers
in the basin), they do represent a cross section of the
important water interests in the basin. The interviews were
focused on understanding the processes of institutional
change and the performance of basin-scale institutions,
matters closely within the knowledge of the interviewees.
[5] In this study we begin with some context concerning
the evolution of Spanish river basin institutions and Spanish
water policy and introduce the Guadalquivir Basin and its
water resource management problems. We then review the
organizational structure of the river basin agency, describe
its relationships with other organizations and with water
users in the basin, and discuss how some political economy
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factors have affected the implementation of integrated water
resource management there. Among those factors we high-
light the agency’s historical path, the patterns of water user
representation within the agency, the agency’s relationships
with other governments, and national-level policy changes
which have altered the agency’s responsibilities as well as
its intergovernmental setting. We conclude by drawing
attention to aspects of politics that affect the implementation
of river basin management and the outcomes that are
realized, which may be relevant to scholars and policy
makers in other settings as well.
2. Spanish Water Policy and Institutions
[6] From the latter half of the 19th century to the late
decades of the 20th, Spanish water policy emphasized a
‘‘structural’’ approach to alleviating problems of drought,
flooding, and supply variability by increasing the availabil-
ity of water supplies and promoting their use, especially for
irrigation. Early national water laws in 1866 and 1879 were
intended to promote water use as a means of enhancing
agricultural productivity and national prosperity. In the early
20th century, national water plans called for central gov-
ernment subsidization of water projects throughout the
country, particularly for irrigation systems. To counter
severe agricultural stagnation of the late 1920s, the Spanish
parliament adopted in 1933 an irrigation expansion plan that
included interbasin transfers of water. These transfers would
shift supplies from relatively rich river basins to drier ones
to address imbalances in water supply and demand across
the country, allowing agriculture to flourish in the southern
basins, which had great agricultural potential.
[7] To further the objectives of these water development
policies, the first river basin agencies, Confederaciones
Hidrográficas (CHs), were created by decree in 1926 for a
few basins to promote, construct, and manage water works
in cooperation with the central government for the benefit of
water users. The CHs were to take the river basin into
consideration in creating and executing a general plan of
hydraulic works and to seek user participation in drafting
the general plan. While created by the central government
and remaining agencies of it, the CHs had autonomous
management with dedicated budgets and direct legal
responsibilities, although the central government reserved
the right to designate certain representatives.
[8] During the Franco regime (1939–1975), also known
as the ‘‘public works state,’’ the central government took on
a larger role in developing Spain’s hydraulic capacity at a
rate of over 1000 Hm3 per decade [Bakker, 2002, p. 775].
User participation within the river basin agencies was
dissolved in 1942. Franco’s water plan also changed the
priority of national water development strategy, promoting
industrial development over agriculture and separating irri-
gation from other aspects of water policy and management.
Economic reforms of the 1950s prompted rapid expansion
in the industrial and tourism sectors and raised standards of
living. These trends contributed to rising water demands
and greater heterogeneity of water uses, stimulating another
burst of hydraulic works construction in the 1960s and
1970s. During this time, a limited level of user participation
was reinstated within the CHs to encourage user coopera-
tion with the administration.
[9] Significant transformations in Spanish government
and politics followed Franco’s death in 1975. A new
constitution was drafted in 1978, creating a federated
democratic system whereby the central government shared
powers with new regional governments, Comunidades
Autónomas (CAs). The new constitution gave these
regional governments considerable water management
responsibilities, many of which overlapped with respon-
sibilities of the river basin authorities. This overlap was
supposed to be resolved by the central government
turning the management of river basins that fit within a
region over to that regional government (CA), while
maintaining central government management through the
CHs only for river basins that extended across more than
one CA.
[10] During the constitutional reform period, emphasis
in the construction of water works changed back from
hydroelectric power to irrigation. The 1970s and 1980s
became a period of rapid and extensive construction of
dams for irrigation, but almost no new hydroelectric dams
were constructed. There was also a reconsideration of the
organizational arrangements at the river basin level for
water works and water management and a reexamination
of national water policy. Regulations on new water
demands and wastewater discharges had been superim-
posed upon the existing system during the 1960s and
1970s without revision to the basic water law. Increasingly,
Spanish water law was seen as poorly suited for problems
of competing water uses, rising awareness of water pollu-
tion, and the emergence of an ecological consciousness
concerning natural resource management. To adapt to
these and other circumstances, a new water law was
adopted in 1985, representing a major reform of water
policy in Spain. The intentions of the new law were
(1) promoting water quality monitoring, protection, and
improvement and providing equitable and reliable mecha-
nisms for funding those improvements; (2) bringing
groundwater into the system of water use regulation along
with surface water, shifting it from private property to
public domain status; (3) incorporating economic tech-
niques of water management and implementing greater
recovery of water costs from water users; (4) strengthening
the river basin authorities through integration of responsi-
bilities at the river basin level; (5) enhancing representation
and participation of water users and other stakeholders on
the river basin authorities; and (6) instituting a more
coordinated water-planning approach, with river basin
plans to be reconciled with a national water plan, which
in turn would be reconciled with European Union (EU)
water regulations.
[11] Further developments after 1985 continued the
movement of Spanish water policy away from the tradi-
tional structural approach. A significant drought from 1992
to 1995 raised public scrutiny and the political significance
of water supply, allocation, and management. A draft
National Water Plan proposed in 1993 included large-scale
interbasin transfers across the country but was abandoned
due to regional opposition, economic concerns, and the
increasing influence of conservationists, consumer groups,
trade unions, and other representatives of civil society [Del
Moral and Saurı́, 1999]. Abandonment of the 1993 plan
signaled the deteriorating power of the ‘‘traditional water
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policy community’’ [Pérez Dı́az et al., 1996] and of the
structural approach in general. In response to the weak-
nesses of the water allocation system revealed during the
drought and to capture aspects of the EU Water Frame-
work Directive of 1998, the 1985 Water Law was
amended in 1999. The 1999 amendments broadened the
definition of ‘‘public waters’’ by including waters devel-
oped through desalination and reuse, tightened water
quality requirements, and encouraged accounting for
ecological values in water allocation decisions. The
system also was to be made more flexible, through
provisions for water banks and transfers of water rights.
Thus the decade of the 1990s had opened with an
ambitious plan to further enlarge Spain’s water infrastruc-
ture and ended with plans that were scaled back signif-
icantly and with water law revisions that increased the
emphasis on environmental protection and economic
management.
[12] The interrelated developments of this period took
place in Spain’s more open posttransition political climate.
A wider array of organized interests were able to make
themselves heard, and water policy making took place in an
atmosphere of greater debate and conflict than had been the
case through most of the preceding century. Some of
the institutional changes during this period also reflected
the growing influence of European Union regulations and
funding as a stimulus to policy reform. This shift in Spanish
water policy from exclusive reliance on structural remedies
to an integrated water resource management approach
continues into the 21st century.
3. Water Management Problems and Practices
in the Guadalquivir River Basin
[13] The Guadalquivir River Basin faces many challenges
to water resource management for which the new direction in
Spanish water policy is highly appropriate. The Guadalquivir
River extends westerly across southern Spain (Figure 1).
The entire 640-km stretch of the river itself lies within
the autonomous region (the Comunidad Autónoma) of
Andalusia. The 57,017-km2 drainage basin (catchment
area) of the Guadalquivir lies almost entirely (90.2%)
within Andalusia, with the remaining 9.8% reaching into
three other regions, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, and
Murcia. As is the case throughout southern (or Medi-
terranean) Spain, the Guadalquivir Basin has a relatively
small share of the nation’s water resources, despite having
a substantial share of Spain’s population. The southern
river basins of Guadalquivir, Guadiana, Sur, Segura, and
Jucar contain 37% of Spain’s population and represent
41% of the Spanish land surface but receive 19% of the
country’s total precipitation and runoff.
3.1. Irregular Supply
[14] The mean annual flow of the Guadalquivir River is
7230 million cubic meters per year (Mm3/yr). Mean annual
Figure 1. Map of the Guadalquivir River Basin, Spain (From Confederación Hidrográfica del
Guadalquivir [1995]). See color version of this figure at back of this issue.
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precipitation in the basin is 596 mm, but this average masks
significant variability over space and time. In the low-
elevation portions of the eastern area of the basin, average
annual precipitation is below 400 mm per year, but it is
>1500 mm per year in the mountains. Evapotranspiration
rates follow an opposite pattern, being highest in the valley
floor and lowland areas (some years >1000 mm) and lowest
at the higher elevations. From year to year, precipitation
values have ranged from as little as 300 mm to as much as
1100 mm. Furthermore, years of extremely high or low
precipitation have tended to cluster together, compounding
the effects of droughts or floods.
[15] Seasonal, or within-year, variability of water supplies
is also great. Most precipitation is concentrated in the winter
months, with peak rainfall occurring from November
through March. Long, dry summers follow, during which
precipitation is virtually nil and evapotranspiration soars.
Storms during the wet months can be true deluges; areas of
the basin have experienced rainfall rates of 150–200 mm,
nearly half of an average year’s precipitation, in just
24 hours. Under such circumstances, the Guadalquivir River
and its tributaries can easily overflow their natural banks
and inundate adjacent lands.
[16] Variability of precipitation presents water manage-
ment challenges of flood control and drought protection in
order for the land of the Guadalquivir Basin to sustain a
substantial population and/or significant agricultural pro-
duction. Since the basin currently sustains both, water
resource management activities in the Guadalquivir Basin
for the past century have been focused on regulating river
and tributary flows for both flood control and water supply
purposes.
3.2. Expanding Demand
[17] Consumptive water use in the basin is dominated by
irrigated agriculture, which accounts for 80% of water
consumption. Municipal and industrial uses account for
12% of consumptive uses, with the remaining 8% appor-
tioned among environmental and other water needs [CH
Guadalquivir, 1995]. Water use in each category is increas-
ing and projected to increase through at least 2012. With all
major sectors of consumptive water use projected to con-
tinue growing, intersectoral shifts of water supplies are
unlikely to suffice to balance demands with supply.
[18] Irrigated land surface continues to grow in the basin
as lands on the adjacent hillsides and farther from the river
are brought under cultivation and as groundwater is used to
a greater extent. Olive groves cover much of the land in the
central portion of the basin and represent a growing share of
the region’s agricultural production. Throughout the central
and eastern portions of the basin, crop types are gradually
shifting to higher-value produce such as fruits and vegeta-
bles. This has occurred in response to changing market
signals, European Union subsidies and regulations, and the
ability to use water more efficiently in irrigating orchards
compared with field crops. In the lower Guadalquivir Basin
between Sevilla and the ocean, however, 35,000 ha of rice
paddies are cultivated, with an estimated water requirement
of 12,000 cubic meters per hectare. The largest irrigation
canal in the basin, with a capacity of 90 cubic meters per
second at the headworks, serves this area.
[19] Municipal and industrial water uses serve a large and
growing population and a changing economy. The basin is
home to 4 million inhabitants and experienced a 5.51%
population growth from 1986 to 1996, compared with
3.1% growth for Spain overall, and this phenomenon of
faster growth in the basin than in the rest of the country
is expected to continue. Already, one tenth of Spanish
inhabitants live in the Guadalquivir Basin.
[20] The population expansion reflects increasing urban-
ization of a predominantly agricultural region. Service
industries, recreation, and tourism have expanded as shares
of the region’s employment and economic product, espe-
cially during the 1990s. These expanding industries have
not displaced agriculture as the area’s dominant economic
sector, but they do indicate a gradually diminishing reliance
on agriculture as the region’s sole defining economic
pursuit. They also account for the fact that municipal and
industrial water use is rising at a pace equivalent to
irrigation’s. The development of cities and industry within
the basin, as well as irrigation, has been accompanied by an
expanded need for reliable and affordable electricity, which
has been supplied in substantial measure through hydro-
power facilities situated on the tributaries and (in a few
instances) the main stem of the Guadalquivir River.
[21] Many water users and water managers have de-
scribed the overall situation of the Guadalquivir River Basin
as one of ‘‘water deficit.’’ The Andalusian Department of
Public Works and Transport estimated the available water
resources within the basin to be 3357 Mm3/yr and total
water demands to be 3578 Mm3/yr, yielding a balance of
negative 241 Mm3/yr. [Consejerı́a de Obras Publicas
y Transportes, 1997] Thus, even in an average year, water
demands in the Guadalquivir Basin exceed available
supplies; in a drought, conditions are only worse. The
growing urban population and changing economic base of
the basin may not have contributed to the water deficit to
the same degree as irrigation, but the deficit aggravates the
challenges of allocating scarce water supplies.
3.3. Risks and Challenges
[22] The changing composition of water uses is linked to
the basin’s water management challenges. The flooding
risks that result from the climatic characteristics are of
greater consequence now that 4 million people live in the
basin, and a downstream metropolis (Sevilla) has become
home to more than a million residents. Industrial and
commercial sites along the river raise the prospective
economic losses from flooding. Thus the basin’s develop-
ment combined with its natural tendencies intensifies the
water management challenge of flood prevention, control,
and response.
[23] The risks associated with drought in the basin, which
is also a function of climate characteristics, are further
exacerbated by the changing water uses in the basin. The
continued expansion of irrigated agriculture and the year-
round nature of urban water demands strain the basin’s
water resources even further during dry periods. The tran-
sition of agriculture in portions of the basin to higher-value
crops grown in orchards and groves may have a beneficial
effect on water use efficiency, but it increases the financial
exposure to drought because of the substantial capital
investment in those crops. Improved water use efficiency
can also reduce the return flows to aquifers and streams that
are relied upon by downstream users, who may have to
increase the capacity of their diversions from the river.
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[24] Taking all the above into account and adding in the
flow requirements of hydroelectric facilities, the water
management challenge associated with flood and drought
protection in the Guadalquivir Basin becomes quite sub-
stantial and complex. Maintaining river flows along the
entire reach of the river that are adequate to sustain
irrigation water demands and hydroelectric generation
requirements in the central and eastern portions of the basin,
urban water demands at various locations but especially in
and around Sevilla, and agricultural water needs in the
lower portion of the basin proves particularly difficult.
Water shortages create zero-sum situations where meeting
the needs of one sector means failing to meet the needs of
others.
3.4. Water Quality Problems
[25] Water quality challenges originate from many of the
same causes as the water deficit. As agriculture has expanded
in the basin, agricultural runoff has contributed to the
degradation of water quality in tributaries and the main
river stem. Industrial sites within the basin (manufacturing
plants, food-processing facilities, etc.) have discharged
chemical and other wastes to the river system. The
growing urban population requires high-quality water for
drinking and generates sewage and wastewater that are
discharged to the river system. Municipal and industrial
sources of pollution are now covered by regional, national,
and EU regulations requiring treatment prior to discharge,
but the construction and operation of treatment facilities
have not kept pace with the quantities of waste produced
and discharged in the basin.
4. River Basin Authority: Decision-Making
Structures and Stakeholder Representation
[26] The challenges described above have stimulated the
creation of institutional arrangements for water management
in the Guadalquivir Basin. Within these arrangements the
CH Guadalquivir, established by royal decree in 1927,
holds responsibility for developing plans and carrying out
policies to address the problems faced within the basin. Its
complicated internal organization, the same as other CHs
in Spain, appears to reflect the combined influence of
three factors: (1) the establishment of distinct offices to
correspond with some of the diverse functions of the CHs,
(2) the lingering effects of past separation of water man-
agement from hydraulic works functions, and (3) the effort
to integrate representation of stakeholders, including central
government, regional government, water users, and other
interested organizations. Table 1 captures the principal




[27] The CH President, an appointee of the national
government, is the central figure and decision maker
within the confederación, in what has been described as
an ‘‘executive chairman’’ position. The president makes
many or most of the appointments and decisions govern-
ing the CH and serves on and interacts with the CH
boards depicted in Table 1. The major staff offices of the
CH are appointed by the president and report to him.
They are (1) the Water Commissioner, responsible for
licensing and policing water uses; (2) the Technical
Director, responsible for construction and management
of water works; (3) General Secretariat, responsible for
the functioning of the internal boards and the day-to-day
administration of the Confederación Hidrográfica offices;
and (4) Water Planning Office, responsible for preparing
and monitoring the Basin Plan.
4.1.2. Governing Board
[28] The basin Governing Board (Junta de Gobierno)
serves in a capacity similar to a board of directors. Its
primary functions are indicated in Table 1. It is supposed
to meet at least once every 3 months and may meet at
any other time the president (who also presides over the
board) considers necessary. The board includes represen-
tatives from the central government, CH staff, regional
governments (CAs), and water users as chosen by the
water users’ assembly. National decrees specify the num-
ber of representatives of each type: (1) The Central
Government has six members who are designated by
the Ministries of Public Works, Transport and Environ-
ment; Economy and Finances; Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food; Industry and Energy; Defense; and Justice and
Interior (The names of the ministries are as listed in
Royal Decrees 924 to 931 (21 July 1989. Changes to the
names and responsibilities of these ministries have taken
place since 1996 (Boletı́n Oficial del Estado, 244, 2002)).
(2) The CH Staff has six members, including the CH
President (who chairs the board), the Water Commissioner,
the Technical Director, the Chief of Planning, and the
General Secretary (who serves as secretary of the board).
(3) The Regional Governments have eight members; in CH
Guadalquivir, the Andalusian regional government has
five representatives on the Governing Board, and the other
three regions with portions of territory in the basin
(Murcia, Castilla-La Mancha, and Extremadura) have one
representative each. (4) Water Users have nine members:
Representatives of water user groups are supposed to be at
least one third of the total number of board members, with
at least one representative for each use type (i.e., urban
supply, irrigation, and energy production). Four of the nine
represent irrigation users, three represent urban water
suppliers, and one each represents hydropower and other
uses.
4.2. Management Bodies
[29] Although they too have user representation, the
management bodies shown in Table 1 exist mainly to
support the functioning of the executive bodies by advising
and implementing their decisions. [Fanlo, 1996]
4.2.1. Operation Boards
[30] The boards, whose functions are indicated in Table 1,
are composed of water users representatives serving 6-year
renewable terms and distributed as follows. (1) Urban Water
Supply is cities or companies supplying more than 100,000
inhabitants, and they receive a representative for each
100,000 inhabitants, up to a maximum of 4. Smaller urban
suppliers are allocated one shared representative for each
100,000 inhabitants or fraction, up to a maximum of 6.
(2) Irrigation refers to Irrigation Communities with surfaces
>3000 ha, who receive up to a maximum of 6 representa-
tives each. All remaining Irrigation Communities are enti-
tled to at least one shared representative, up to a maximum
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of 6. (3) Hydropower refers to hydropower companies with
installed capacity of >50,000 KVA, and they receive one
representative for each 50,000 KVA or fraction, up to a
maximum of 4. All remaining companies receive one
shared representative for each 50,000 KVA or fraction,
up to a maximum of 6. (4) Other industrial uses indicate
all other industrial water uses, and they receive one
representative for each 20 Mm3/year of water consump-
tion. (5) Other uses indicates the remaining uses (whether
or not grouped in Users Communities), and the CH
Governing Board will consider the requests of the users
involved and decide on the number of representatives, up
to a maximum of 6.
[31] Clearly, this representative structure of the Operation
Boards assures that irrigation and/or hydropower members
outnumber urban and other representatives. This structure,
in turn, influences the composition of the Water Users
Assembly and the Reservoir Releases Commission.
4.2.2. Water Users’ Assembly
[32] The assembly, chaired by the CH President, is
composed of the user representatives from all the Operation
Boards of the basin. Representatives of the central and
regional governments and CH staff are allowed to attend
assembly meetings but may not vote. The assembly is
supposed to meet in ordinary sessions once a year and
may hold special sessions if called by the CH President or
requested by at least one third of the members. In addition
to its functions indicated in Table 1, the Water Users’
Assembly provides an institutional opportunity for impor-
tant discussion and debate on the main water management
issues of the basin. This depends, of course, on whether it is
regularly convened and consulted.
Table 1. Boards and Offices of the CHa
Board/Office Description
Executive Bodies
President, also referred to as
Chairman
The President is appointed by the Council of Ministers at the
proposal of Ministry of Environment.
Governing Board (Junta de
Gobierno), also referred to as
Management Board
Headed by the CH President, the board is in charge of financial
matters, approves action plans, and defines aquifer depletion
and groundwater protection areas.
Management Bodies
Operation Boards (Junta de
Explotación)
There are several of these. They coordinate the management of
hydraulic works and water resources in specific catchment
areas and/or hydrogeological units. They are composed of
representatives of the administration and of the water users
(public and private water supply companies, irrigation
associations, hydroelectric companies and industrial users).
The 1985 Waters Act establishes the rate of representation
of each sector on the boards, according to its importance in
the basin.
Water Users’ Assembly
(Asamblea de Usuarios), also
referred to as Assembly of
Users
Headed by the CH President, it is composed of all users that are
part of the Operation Boards. Its purpose is to make
recommendations concerning CH policies for the
coordinated management of hydraulic works and water
resources throughout the basin.
Reservoir Releases Commission
(Comisión de Desemblase),
also referred to as the Dam
Water Releases Commission
Headed by the CH President, it is responsible for making
recommendations to the President concerning the
appropriate amounts and timing for releasing water from the
reservoirs, taking into account the rights of the different
users and the aquifers located in the basin. The Water
Users’ Assembly proposes which users should be members
of this Commission. A Permanent Committee of this
commission is established to respond to emergency
situations such as floods or drought which require unusual
measures in relation to the release of water or filling up of
reservoirs.
Water Works Commissions (Junta
de Obras)
These provide an opportunity for water users who will be served
by a particular project to receive information and make
recommendations about it.
Planning Bodies
Basin Water Council (Consejo del
Agua de Cuenca)
Headed by the CH President, it is responsible for approval of the
Basin Hydrological Plan, which is forwarded to the central
Government. It is composed of representatives of different
departments of central and regional governments, technical
services, and basin stakeholders (at least 33% of council
membership) including professional associations and
environmental groups.
Planning Office (Oficina de
Planificación)
This is a CH staff office headed by the Chief of Water Planning
(Jefe de Planification) and is responsible for drafting,
monitoring, and reviewing the Basin Hydrological Plan and
providing technical support to the Basin Water Council.
aSource: Moral et al. [2000].
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4.2.3. Reservoir Releases Commission
[33] This commission (Comisión de Desembalse) meets
in October to decide upon the proper filling level of the
reservoirs during the wet season and at the beginning of
spring to decide upon the allocation of reservoir releases
during the dry season. The commission’s recommendations
must take into account the water supplies expected to be
available and the licenses held by water users. The CH
President chairs the commission, and the other members are
the Water Commissioner, the Technical Director, two central
government representatives, one representative of the state
electric company, and user representatives recommended by
the Water Users’ Assembly and appointed by the Governing
Board.
[34] Commission members submit proposals for the res-
ervoir water release regimes to the CH President. The
president asks the Water Commissioner, the Technical
Director, and the Chief of Operations for their opinions.
If these agree with the commission’s recommendations,
their common position is binding upon the president. If
not, the president will decide on the basis of the diverging
opinions.
[35] The water allocations which the commission must
take into account in making its recommendations are
established in the Basin Water Plan. Irrigation water allo-
cations are based on hypothetical average values of water
demand per hectare for each crop type. Urban water
allowances are based on hypothetical average values of
water consumption per capita multiplied by population size.
Because these water allowance values are not based on data
about actual water use, they are subject to some negotiation.
Indeed, it is the negotiation of the water allocations each
year that attracts user participation in the commissions.
Traditionally, the irrigation sector has had a leading role
in guiding those commission decisions [Moral et al., 2000;
SIRCH Team, 2001, pp. 26–27]. This is not surprising since
the user representatives to the Reservoir Releases Commis-
sion are nominated by the Water Users’ Assembly, which is
made up of the user representatives from the Operation
Boards, which are set up to assure more representatives
from irrigation than any other water use.
4.2.4. Water Works Commissions
[36] These commissions are a communication link with
prospective users of specific projects. There are several
commissions since one may be established for any water
project with planned costs greater than US$7 million. Their
main task is to inform users with information (especially
economic information) about the project. The CH Govern-
ing Board determines the number and composition of user
representatives to the commissions based on the Technical
Director’s recommendations.
4.3. Planning Bodies: The Basin Water Council and
Office of Water Planning
[37] The central role of water planning in Spain gives a
special significance to the National Water Council and the
Basin Water Councils. A Basin Water Council approves the
Basin Water Plan and any amendments thereto for submis-
sion to the central government’s National Water Council.
The Basin Water Plan is developed primarily by the CH
staff (particularly the Office of Water Planning) and the
relevant departments of the Ministry of the Environment.
The Basin Water Council provides advice and input, repre-
sents major water interests, chooses among alternatives
suggested by the staff and adopts the plan. The full council
meets once or twice per year, but a smaller Executive
Committee meets more often.
[38] The major actors involved in water planning (the
central government, regional governments, and water users)
are represented on the Basin Water Councils, with roughly
one third from each group. The councils therefore provide
an opportunity for central and regional government to
coordinate their activities in water management and plan-
ning. User participation was originally limited to user
groups represented in other river basin internal committees
(irrigation user communities, water supply companies, in-
dustrial users, and hydropower companies), but a 1994
decree extended stakeholder participation to one represen-
tative of farmers’ organizations and one representative of
environmental groups.
4.4. Role of Regional Government
[39] Much of the focus on river basin management in
Spain is understandably fixed upon the river basin author-
ities, some of which date back to the 1920s. However, as
noted above, regional governments were created in 1978
with policy-making responsibilities that include several
aspects of natural resource management, environmental
and public health protection, and economic development.
Article 148 of the constitution and the ensuing Autonomy
Act further defining the regional governments’ powers gave
the regional governments authority over (1) public works of
interest to the regional government within its own territory,
(2) implementation of environmental protections, (3) plan-
ning, construction, and operation of hydraulic works,
canals, and irrigation projects of interest to the regional
government, (4) mineral and thermal waters, (5) fishing,
with respect to shellfish, aquaculture, and fluvial (riverine)
fish, (6) woodland and forestry issues, (7) agriculture and
livestock farming, in accordance with general economic
planning, (8) land use planning, and (9) promotion of the
economic development of the region within the objectives
established by the national economic policy.
[40] On the other hand, Article 149 establishes that the
central government is responsible, among other things, for
(1) public works of general national interest, (2) water
resources management in river basins shared by more than
one region (this is the particular responsibility of the
interregional river basin agencies such as the one in Gua-
dalquivir), (3) basic legislation on environmental protection,
and (4) coordination of general economic planning. In
addition, Article 132.1 places the central government in
charge of the protection of public domain and common
property, and Article 132.2 regulates the authority of central
government to declare by law natural resources as public
domain.
[41] Several offices and departments of the Andalusian
regional government have programs or responsibilities
relating to water management in the Guadalquivir Basin.
They include the Water Secretariat, the Department of
Agriculture and Fisheries, the Department of the Environ-
ment, and the Department of Health. The regional govern-
ment has also organized and sponsored a commission, the
Andalusian Water Council (AWC), to convene a broad
range of water stakeholders for discussion of water policy
and planning.
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[42] AWC was established in 1994, during the drought,
and has continued to meet since (e.g., three times during
2002). The regional government’s rationale for creating the
AWC is that the drought revealed serious water problems in
the region that needed to be addressed regionally and in a
participatory framework. The AWC does not have any
formal decision-making authority, but can make policy
recommendations; for example, it published an ‘‘Andalu-
sian agreement for water’’ in 1994. During 2002, the AWC
was considering the development of a regional position on
the 2001 national water plan, which would likely recom-
mend improved demand management, control of illegal
water uses, and promotion of desalination as alternatives
to the plan’s proposed interbasin water transfer project.
5. Politics and Policy Making in the
Guadalquivir Basin: River Basin Authority
Versus Regional Government
[43] The division of responsibilities concerning water
resource management in Spain is not as simple as merely
identifying interregional basins and intraregional basins and
associating the former with the central government and the
latter with the regional governments. Although the 1985
water law declared that regional governments have primary
responsibility for water management only in intraregional
basins, it is also true that the Comunidades Autónomas have
authority with respect to some aspects of water resource
management even in interregional basins such as Guadal-
quivir. Furthermore, the regional governments and river
basin authorities are linked organizationally: as noted
above, Communidad Autonoma representatives sit on some
Confederación Hidrográfica boards and commissions.
[44] The evolution since 1978 of central and regional
government responsibilities on different aspects of water
management has been a dynamic and sometimes discordant
process. The regional government’s possession of (or at
least claim to) so much water-related responsibility and
authority presents heightened prospects for confusion and
conflict in a river basin such as Guadalquivir which lies
almost entirely within the Andalusian region and comprises
a majority of the territory and population of that region. The
exercise of water-related powers by CA Andalusia can
largely overlap the exercise of water management functions
by CH Guadalquivir. Similarly, the exercise of water man-
agement functions by CH Guadalquivir has great signifi-
cance to the economy and population of CA Andalusia.
[45] The potential for conflict between regional govern-
ment water policies and basin authority water policies is
heightened by social and political factors. The river basin
agency’s structure of representation and governance gives
greatest weight to irrigation users, and the larger irrigation
communities have strengthened their influence within the
Confederación Hidrográfica by speaking and acting collec-
tively through Feragua, a basin-wide association of irriga-
tion communities. The regional government, on the other
hand, is elected on a one person, one vote system, so its
voting base reflects the increasing urbanization of the
region’s population and economy. To the extent that irriga-
tion and urban water interests in the management of water
resources and the operation of river basin facilities come
into conflict, those differences may be expressed as diver-
gent views and policies from the CH and the CA. Further-
more, there may be an aggravating partisan factor: the
central government (with a prominent role in the CH) has
been a Popular Party government from 1996 to 2004, while
the Socialist Party prevails in Andalusian regional govern-
ment. Individuals interviewed for this project disagreed over
the extent to which this difference of party control mattered in
decisions concerning water management in the Guadalquivir
basin, but the existence of the difference was mentioned
several times.
[46] The regional government’s support of such a forum
as the Andalusian Water Council reflects an openly stated
desire to develop a leadership role in water policy that the
structure of Spanish water management neither explicitly
confers nor explicitly forbids. Further evidence of the
regional government’s intentions in this regard comes from
its use of funding authority for intrabasin water projects.
The Andalusian regional government has used its funds to
promote certain subbasin level changes in water manage-
ment practices. It has funded treatment plants for the
improvement of water quality in the lower basin and near
the coast. It has funded irrigation improvements for irriga-
tion communities that have agreed to manage water supplies
more carefully and control increases of water demand. It has
funded projects for urban water suppliers conditioned on
improvements to their management practices, changes in
their rate structures to promote conservation, and reduction
of flood risks through removal of structures from flood-
plains. For instance, when Sevilla needed additional sec-
ondary wastewater treatment capacity, the Andalusian
regional government funded and built the project, then
transferred it to the city’s water utility, Empresa Municipal
de Abastecimiento y Saneamiento de Aguas de Sevilla S. A.
(EMASESA), to operate and maintain. The CA’s participa-
tion was conditioned on EMASESA making improvements
to its own works.
[47] An ultimate goal of the regional government appears
to be the passage of its own regional water act. Of course,
the 1985 national water law and its 1999 amendments could
not be contradicted by anything passed at the regional level,
but within those contours, there remains considerable room
for a regional government to express water policy priorities
and adopt policies not currently covered by national law;
specifically mentioned to us was the fact that existing
national law does not cover drought management.
[48] The regional government has expressed a desire to
have other water management functions explicitly trans-
ferred to it by the central government. Among the functions
mentioned were licensing of water uses, development of
interuser agreements for water transfers to deal with short-
ages, and establishing some subbasin water management
organizations (on the view that the river basins are in certain
respects too big for effective participation and efficient
management). The regional government’s Water Secretariat
and the Andalusian Water Council would evolve to adopt
and pursue some of these policy initiatives if the central
government gave them the opportunity.
[49] This, of course, is the view from the regional govern-
ment’s perspective. Other organizations within the river
basin did not necessarily share the regional government’s
vision for its enlarged and more active role in the manage-
ment of the basin’s water resources. CH Guadalquivir,
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which is attached to the central government, reiterated the
central government position that the Guadalquivir basin is
an interregional basin (since 10% of the basin area lies in
regions other than Andalusia) and thus is appropriately
managed by and through the CH. The association of
irrigation communities, Feragua, which is so well integrated
into the CH boards and commissions, shared the view that
the CH should have the primary water policy and manage-
ment roles in the basin.
6. A Focus on Representation and Participation
of Stakeholders in the Guadalquivir Basin
[50] Tensions over regional government leadership versus
basin authority leadership are connected with issues of the
representation of water interests in the basin. Uneven
representation and participation in decision making at the
basin level can result in management practices that deviate
substantially from the country’s declared water policies. For
example, Spanish water law gives top priority to urban
drinking water supplies, but this priority is not reflected in
practice. Irrigators receive a disproportionately large share
of water at a subsidized rate, which poses a problem in
periods of water scarcity when cities have insufficient
amounts for their populations. Residents of Sevilla endured
daily water service outages during the 1992–1995 drought,
including up to 12 hours per day without running water.
This would seem inconsistent with the notion that domestic
drinking water supplies have first call on available water.
[51] Another disjuncture between basin practice and
national policy was evident in the contrast between the
priorities apparently given to CH Guadalquivir’s supply
augmentation and demand management functions. The
1985 water law and the 1999 amendments made CHs
responsible for licensing water uses, developing and main-
taining registries of authorized uses, and monitoring water
use to detect and stop illegal water uses. CH staff acknowl-
edged to us that the water use registry for the basin was still
far behind completion and that illegal water uses (especially
of groundwater) in the basin remained a substantial prob-
lem. On the other hand, the staff was able to show us plans
that appeared to be kept quite up to date listing the water
projects they would like to construct in the basin. The
distinction between the staff’s high expertise and interest
at planning structural projects versus the slow and still
incomplete execution of its demand management tasks
reinforced the perception that the presence of a basin
management agency has not necessarily facilitated the
implementation of IWRM as embraced by the 1985 and
1999 laws.
[52] A third example of basin-level practice deviating
from national policy involves water transfers. During the
1992–1995 drought the city of Sevilla and some neighbor-
ing farmers worked out an emergency exchange that pro-
vided Sevilla with some urgently needed additional water.
Given this experience and the 1999 amendments to the
national water law, an obvious course for the city would be
to secure resources for future emergencies by negotiating
water transfer agreements with one or more irrigation
communities in the area. CH Guadalquivir could broker
such arrangements as part of its responsibility for imple-
menting this aspect of the 1999 amendments. Instead, with
the CH’s support, Sevilla is building a large surface water
reservoir at significant financial and environmental costs.
The 1999 amendments directed CHs to balance environ-
mental values against the more traditional ‘‘production
factor’’ uses of water that have taken priority through
mitigation measures. Several individuals in the basin men-
tioned to us that the costs of mitigation measures for the
environmental impacts of the new reservoir exceed the
construction costs. The project is proceeding despite
the environmental degradation and the newly required costs
to mitigate it. The old structural policy of solving water
scarcity problems by building more structures thus contin-
ues to be implemented at the basin level, even though
national policy would appear to favor transfers as a more
economically efficient and less environmentally detrimental
option. Of course, the structural approach protects irrigation
interests from water transfers to support the basin’s growing
urban population and economy.
[53] The strength of the irrigation sector is maintained
through both formal and informal relationships and practi-
ces. As noted earlier, on the CH Operation Boards, a large
Irrigation Community (>60,000 ha) can have six represen-
tatives, but the largest of cities (>100,000 inhabitants) can
have no more than four. Thus even a city such as Sevilla
with more than a million inhabitants will have no more than
four representatives on an Operation Board while irrigators
can have more.
[54] Informal relationships and practices reinforce this
dominance. It was clear from our interviews in the basin
that some of the river basin authority boards and commis-
sions with the broadest stakeholder representation, includ-
ing the Water Users Assembly, meet relatively infrequently.
Between meetings, however, irrigator representatives main-
tain close and frequent contact with CH Guadalquivir staff
and officials. The urban water suppliers and regional
government representatives did not appear to enjoy similar
relationships of easy informal access and expressed frustra-
tion at feeling relatively cut off from the CH and its
decisions.
[55] At present, there are different levels of interaction
and coordination between municipal suppliers and the CH
Guadalquivir. At the technical staff level, with respect to
management functions such as reservoir releases and the
operation of hydropower plants, the interaction and coordi-
nation is virtually on a daily basis. With respect to the
higher-level policy setting, however, interaction and coor-
dination is reportedly less smooth. There are occasional
challenges and disputes; for instance, the municipal supplier
for the city of Sevilla has requested sole management
authority of the four reservoirs currently serving Sevilla as
well as the new one slated for construction. CH Guadalqui-
vir has not yet granted this request and remains reluctant to
relinquish authority.
[56] Aside from traditional water policy actors, political
parties, trade unions, and environmental groups are openly
and actively involved as stakeholders in the water debate.
Some trade unions have or are creating specific Environment
Departments that develop and represent the union’s strategic
policy position in the field of water management. Environ-
mental organizations have been gaining some momentum
in Spain, and recently, seats have been designated on
the CHs’ consultative committees for environmental and
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consumers’ organizations. On the other hand, the ground-
water sector and those involved with economic and envi-
ronmental analysis of water development projects continue
to be excluded in basin management decisions to a large
extent.
[57] More openly expressed conflict among water stake-
holders in Spain reassuringly reflects the fact that debate
was muffled for decades through the dictatorship period.
However, conflicts concerning water management appear to
be taking place outside the river basin authorities rather than
finding expression within them. This suggests that a basin
authority such as the CH Guadalquivir may still be per-
ceived as a relatively closed agency serving irrigators’
interests and is not yet the forum within which a broader
range of basin stakeholders express their views and deter-
mine basin policy direction.
7. River Basin Authority and River Basin
Management in the Guadalquivir Basin
[58] The Guadalquivir example demonstrates the chal-
lenges of shifting from the structural policy toward the
IWRM objectives embodied in the 1985 water law and
ensuing policies. Contemplating those challenges with an
empirical case study such as this one may provide some
helpful information for the implementation of basin-level
integrated water management in other locations. Therefore,
in this section we briefly highlight five factors that have
contributed to those challenges in the Guadalquivir Basin.
7.1. Path Dependency
[59] The Spanish river basin authorities such as CH
Guadalquivir were established primarily to build and oper-
ate water supply infrastructure with central government
subsidies. Having had a distinct mission for 60 years, an
agency may be slow or even reluctant to adapt to a new
policy environment that calls for equal attention to demand
management, cost recovery, water quality, and ecological
values. Also, tangible results are most easily measured and
achieved for the construction and operation of water works.
Almost two decades after the 1985 water reform law, CHs
such as Guadalquivir are still catching up. Water licensing,
water use monitoring, fee collection, and cost recovery are
being implemented with less vigor or being transferred to
other organizations.
7.2. Stakeholder Representation and the Direction of
Policy at the Basin Level
[60] It is one thing to promote the concept of basin-level
institutions as a way of encouraging stakeholder represen-
tation and participation. It is quite another to structure
representation and participation processes so that water
interests throughout the basin have fair chances of being
heard and of influencing basin policy and practice. If one
water use sector has favorably weighted representation
within the basin authority, basin policy is more likely to
reflect its preferences. Other water interests or values may
be compromised in ways that veer water management
practices away from IWRM principles of equitable and
ecologically sustainable approaches to meeting water needs.
Furthermore, those who are or perceive themselves as
underrepresented within the basin authority may question
or reject the legitimacy of its decision making.
[61] In the Guadalquivir case these differences in the
representation of stakeholder interests appear to be closely
associated to degrees of support for the status quo in the
basin versus support for change. The CH staff, with exten-
sive experience in managing structural projects and close
connections to the central government, appeared quite
supportive of current institutional arrangements and water
management practices in the basin. So did the federation of
irrigation communities, which dominates the selection of
water user representatives on the CH boards and commis-
sions. On the other hand, individuals with urban water
supply services and the Andalusian regional government
appeared to support substantial additional reform, with
respect both to water management practices and to the
organizational structure and distribution of responsibilities
for water management within the basin.
7.3. Informal Relationships Among Basin Policy
Makers and Stakeholders
[62] Formal organizational structures are only one face of
representation and participation; informal relationships and
interactions may be equally or more important. Although
stakeholder representation on the CH’s boards and commis-
sions has been expanded, the existing management structure
and internal culture of CH Guadalquivir appear to have
changed more slowly. The consultative boards and com-
missions can inform the process (assuming they meet
regularly), but formal decision making remains concentrated
in the hands of the CH president and board. Informal modes
of communication and cooperation between basin-level
policy makers stakeholders from particular water use sectors
with long-standing ties to them can override or undermine
even carefully crafted formal arrangements regarding stake-
holder representation or participation.
7.4. Context of Center-Periphery Relations
[63] If national policy delegates some water management
functions to basin authorities but other water management
functions to closely overlapping jurisdictions, unproductive
rivalries rather than polycentric complementarities may
result. These problems are compounded when partisan
control of the different jurisdictions is divided. These
observations are related to a question that is often raised
with respect to water governance, namely, whether it is
preferable to establish separate basin-scale institutions or
work through other jurisdictions that overlap the basin
substantially but do not match it exactly. The Guadalquivir
case is somewhat unusual in this regard because the
sequence of institutional creation is the opposite of what
might normally be expected: the basin authorities in Spain
existed before the regional governments were created.
Nonetheless, the tensions between regional government
and basin authority in the Guadalquivir case highlight the
importance of the question.
7.5. Degree of National Government Commitment to
IWRM
[64] Basin-level authorities are not entirely at fault for
delayed or incomplete implementation of IWRM when it
seems that the central government has some difficulty
making up its own mind about how to proceed. According
to Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee
[2000, p. 71], ‘‘IWRM is a process that promotes the
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coordinated development and management of water, land
and related resources in order to maximize the resultant
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.’’
Although the 1985 water law directed Spanish water policy
toward IWRM, the draft 1993 National Water Plan in Spain
seemed to signal a continuation of the traditional structural
approach of relying heavily upon subsidized projects
to expand water supplies, even with significant risk to
environmental needs. The 1999 water law amendments
reiterated the commitment of national water policy to the
IWRM approach, but the revised National Water Plan
adopted in 2002 still contains a large, costly, and potentially
environmentally damaging interbasin transfer project that
may not be needed if existing water supplies and land
uses were managed in a more carefully coordinated way.
National water policy and planning is inevitably made
through a political process in which regional and sectoral
water interests contend for a maximum share of benefits and
minimal share of costs, and the seemingly rational balance
contained in definitions of IWRM such as the one above is
harder to achieve than it is to express.
8. Concluding Remarks
[65] This analysis and critique is not intended to suggest
that Spanish water policy in general, or CH Guadalquivir in
particular, is completely wrong or ineffective. Changes to
Spanish water law and policy in 1985 and since have indeed
encouraged a movement in the direction of IWRM, and
there are reasons to believe that the existence of basin
authorities with formal representation from several types
of stakeholders places Spain ahead of many other countries
in its ability to implement IWRM over the long run.
[66] The Guadalquivir example does indicate, however,
that the existence of basin-scale institutions does not serve
as an organizational ‘‘magic wand’’ to produce swift and
complete implementation of IWRM at the river basin level.
National policy makers (and the external analysts and
consultants who advise them) must pay attention to politi-
cal, institutional, and other factors, especially those at the
basin level itself, that affect the ability and willingness of
basin policy makers to convert IWRM from policy to
practice.
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Figure 1. Map of the Guadalquivir River Basin, Spain (From Confederación Hidrográfica del
Guadalquivir [1995]).
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